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SHARON L. MILES, and JOHN
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Suprjeme Court Case No. 890431
(Utah Court of Appeals
No1. (880030(A)-CA)

Defendants/Petitioners.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY'S PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question presented for review is misstated in
petitioner's petition.

Correctly presented, the question

presented to the Utah Court of Appeals in both the appeal and the
petition for rehearing and in this petition is "What is the duty
of a trustee under a deed of trust when the trustee is presented,
in the absence of the original trust deed and note, with a forged,
although purportedly acknowledged, request for reconveyance?"
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals may be found as No.
1

880030(A)-CA of the records of the Utah Court of Appeals and as
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, et al., 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27
(Utah Ct.App. 1989).

Additionally, there is a related appeal, No.

88-0030(B)-CA, in which the Court of Appeals rendered a Memorandum
Decision on October 27, 1989.

Appellants in that matter have

moved this Court for an extension of time in which to file a brief
in opposition due to the fact that those appellants have
petitioned the Court of AppeaLs for rehearing in that matter.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT
Guardian's petition is brought before the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah pursuant to Rule 42 et seq. of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

The decision for which review is sought was

entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 29, 1989.
Petitioners' request for a rehearing was denied by the Court of
Appeals on September 26, 1989.

Petitioners served their petition

for writ of certiori on October 26, 1989.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTE
The interpretation of the following statute is relevant to
this matter:
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-33 (1953) Satisfaction of
obligation secured by trust deed—Reconveyance of trust property.
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The reconveyance
may designate the grantee therein as "the person or persons
entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed
shall deliver to the trustor or his successor in interest the
trust deed and the note or other evidence of the obligation
2

so satisfied. Any beneficiary under £uch trust deed who
refuses to request a reconveyance froJn the trustee for a
period of thirty days after written demand therefor is made
by the trustor or his successor in interest shall be liable
to the trustor or his successor in interest, as the case may
be, for double damages resulting from such refusal, or such
trustor or his successor in interest may bring an action
against the beneficiary and trustee to compel a reconveyance
of the trust property and in such action the judgment of the
court shall be that the trustee reconyey the trust property
and that the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor
in interest, as the case may be, the costs of suit including
a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages resulting from
the refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as
hereinabove provided. (Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF THE CAi^E
The underlying cause out of which this petition arises is an
action by Bette Wycalis (Wycalis), a beneficiary under a deed of
trust, for breach of the duty owed Wycalis| by Guardian Title
Company and its President, Warren Curliss, her trustee
(Guardian).

Wycalis asserted in her Complhint that Guardian

breached the duty owed Wycalis when Guardian, in relying upon a
forged, purportedly acknowledged request for reconveyance,
reconveyed her security interest in the absence of delivery of the
original promissory note and deed of trust to the trustee and
without communication with Wycalis to determine if the note had
been paid.
Guardian moved for summary judgment op. the grounds that
Guardian owed no duty to foresee the criminal act of the forgery
and that it acted in good faith in relying exclusively upon the
"acknowledgement" which is given an indicia of authenticity under
3

Utah law.

The trial court granted Guardian's motion for summary

judgment, which judgment was appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

That Court rendered its opinion on August 29, 1989

reversing and remanding the case for trial.

Guardian petitioned

the Court of Appeals for rehearing, which petition was denied on
September 26, 1989.

On October 26, 1989 Guardian filed its

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about July 1, 1980, defendant R & C Associates

(R & C) by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, and Randy
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson and Debra S. Christenson executed an
installment promissory note payable to Bette Wycalis and her
mother, Eva Robertson, in the amount of $61,800.00.

(Ex. 1 Krantz

deposition; Krantz deposition pp. 11-12; Ex. 2, B. Christenson
deposition; B. Christenson deposition pp. 8, 10 and 17; Ex. 4,
Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 55-56; D. Christenson
deposition p. 3.)
2.

The promissory note was payment for Wycalis' interest in

real property located in Helper, Utah, which she had sold and
conveyed to defendants Krantz and Christenson.

(Ex. 2 Krantz

deposition; Krantz deposition pp. 5, 9 and 10; Ex. 2, B.
Christenson deposition; B. Christenson deposition pp. 5-7, 15; Ex.
4, Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 55-56; D.
Christenson deposition p. 4.)
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3.

On or about June 26, 1980, defendant R & C, as trustor,

by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, executed, as
security for payment of the July 1, 1980, promissory note, a
second trust deed to substitute for Wycali^f original security in
the Heljper property naming Wycalis and her mother, Eva Robertson,
as beneficiaries, and Guardian as trustee.

(Krantz deposition pp.

12, 42; B. Christenson deposition pp. 9, 1(^, 42-43; Ex. 5, Wycalis
deposition.)
4.

The trust deed of June 26, 1980, (described property

located in Weber County, State of Utah.

(?x. 5, Wycalis

deposition).
5.

While R & C was an obligor on the promissory note/ as

among Krantz, Christensons and R & C, the ifinderstanding was that
Christensons and Krantz were to pay the dept and that R & C loaned
the security as substitute security for the Helper property for
consideration and as a return favor for a favor Krantz had done
Miller.

(Krantz deposition pp. 5-7; B. Christenson deposition pp.

5-17, 21-22, 49.)
6.

On the 31st day of March, 1983, plaintiff was assigned

her mother's interest in the trust deed ancfl trust deed note.

(Ex.

15, Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 88-89.)
7.

Wycalis received payments, as required by the note, from

August 20, 1980, until December 1982, at wljiich time defendants
Krantz and Christenson ceased making payments. (Krantz deposition
5

p. 41; Ex. 3, B. Christenson deposition; B. Christenson deposition
pp. 11-13; Wycalis deposition pp. 56, 59-60; D. Christenson
deposition p. 4.)
8.

Upon the failure of the obligors to make the required

payments, plaintiff contacted an attorney in order to enforce the
terms of the trust deed and was advised that her interest in the
property had been reconveyed.
9.

(Wycalis deposition pp. 73-74. )

Plaintiff's trust deed was reconveyed and she was

divested of her security interest on December 26, 1980, when
defendant Guardian Title executed and recorded a deed of
reconveyance.

(Ex. 11, Wycalis deposition; Curlis deposition pp.

39, 48-50; Miles deposition pp. 10-11.)
10.

Guardian Title executed a deed of reconveyance on

December 26, 1980, after receiving a forged, although
acknowledged, request for reconveyance.

(Miles deposition pp.

100-11. )
11.

Prior to the reconveyance of Wycalis interest, Guardian

did not require delivery of the original trust deed note or trust
deed as proof of payment.

(Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R.

217-218. )
12.

Guardian did not in any manner communicate with

plaintiff prior to the reconveyance to determine whether or not
she had been paid.

(Miles deposition pp. 11-12; Curliss

deposition pp. 48-52; Wycalis deposition pp. 40-43, 60-66.)
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13.

T h i s is so even t.houqh G u a r d i a n title knew the address

of plaintiff,,
14.
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217-218. )
21.

Plaintiff did not authorize reconveyance of her interest

in the property.
22.

(Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R. 217-218.)

Plaintiff does not know who may have signed her name and

the name of her mother to the request for reconveyance.
(Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R. 217-218.)
23.

Plaintiff does not know, and has never heard of, Ed

Maass, the notary who notarized the request for reconveyance.
(Wycalis deposition p. 84.)
24.

Upon reconveyance of the June 26, 1980, trust deed,

Guardian Title substituted another trust deed dated December 29,
1980, as security for plaintiff.

That trust deed described

property different than the property described in the June 26,
1980, trust deed.

(Ex. 12, Wycalis deposition; Krantz deposition

p. 31; Miles deposition pp. 10-11.)
25.

A letter of instruction purportedly bearing the

signature of plaintiff authorized the substitution of the
security.
26.

(Ex. 8 Wycalis deposition; Miles deposition pp. 8-9.)
Wycalis did not sign the letter of instruction.

(Ex. 8,

Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 77-78.)
27.

Plaintiff did not authorize another to sign her name to

the letter of instruction.

(Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R.

217-218. )
28.

Plaintiff does not know who may have signed her name to
8
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RESPONSK TO PETITIONER 3 ARGUMENT ,
INTRODUCTION
Guardian's petiti on before this court oresents the ;1entical
issues for review as were bef~:

* 9

\ i i

offers no new authority or rationale as to why the Court of
Appeals erred, only that it "appeared not to address" Guardian's
principal argument.

Wycalis responds to Guardian's three

arguments as follows.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT I
Petitioners' argument that the Court of Appeals decision in
this case is in conflict with Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah
1977) is sheer nonsense, as is petitioner's assertion that the
Court of Appeals "did not appear to directly address Guardian's
argument that it owed no duty to plaintiff to foresee a deliberate
criminal act perpetuated by another."
added.)

The argument is disingenuous.

(Petition page 9, emphasis
The entirety of

petitioner's case argued to the Court of Appeals was founded upon
that argument.

Petitioner expended 32 pages in its brief

expounding the merits of that theory to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner's case and theory were argued thoroughly to the Court
of Appeals and that court ruled against petitioners, discreetly
and considerately not mentioning the degree by which their theory
is wide of the mark.

That this is true is shown repeatedly

through the Court of Appeals' decision wherein that court holds
that Guardian owed Wycalis a duty.

( E.g. "It does not

necessarily follow, however, that a trust deed trustee can be said
to have fully discharged its duty of care in reconveyxng property
in response to a written submission which includes an acknowledged
10
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... •

of Appeals directly and correctly addressed Guardian's argument
holding that the case of Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977)
which involved a stranger's duty to foresee a murder of a third
party did not apply to the contractual setting in which a deed of
trust deed trustee contracted to protect the interest of its
beneficiary.
Finally, Guardian's theory is not applicable because it was
not the criminal act which caused the loss of Wycalis's security.
Had Guardian properly performed its duty as a trustee the criminal
act would have resulted in no harm.

It was the negligent reliance

by Guardian and its president Warren Curliss upon the product of
the criminal act which caused the loss of Wycalis's security, not
the criminal act itself.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT II
Under Point II Guardian asserts that the Court of Appeals
based its opinion upon issues not raised at trial in ruling that
additional testimony upon the standard of care in the industry was
required.
The Court of Appeals did not err in remanding the matter for
trial upon the standard of care in the industry.

Wycalis argued

both at the trial court and on appeal, as does Guardian in this
petition, that based upon the uncontroverted facts of record, this
case could be decided as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeals

disagreed and was unwilling to make such determination in the
12

absence of evidence of the standard of fare in the industry,
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deals with the indicia of authenticity given acknowledgements,
Guardian starts out by misstating the facts of record.

Guardian

asserts that the request for reconveyance was "properly
acknowledged".

This is simply not true.

Guardian assumed for

purposes of its motion for summary judgment that the signature was
a forgery.

It is then nonsense to assert that a forged signature

is properly acknowledged when the signature subject of the
purported acknowledgement is admitted to be a fraud.
The question concerning the indicia of authenticity afforded
an acknowledgement was adequately addressed in footnote 10 of the
Court of Appeals' decision where it is stated:
It is of course true that acknowledged documents have a
special status in certain contexts. Properly acknowledged
documents may be admitted into evidence without other
evidence of their authenticity. See Utah R. Evid. 902(8).
Subject to certain exceptions, see Utah Code Ann„ Section
57-4a-3 (1986), only acknowledged documents are entitled to
recordation. Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-1 (1986). It does
not necessarily follow, however, that a trust deed trustee
can be said to have fully discharged its duty of care in
reconveying property in response to a written submission
which includes an acknowledged request for reconveyance.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing new, different or significant in the rehash
of Guardian's arguments presented in its Petition.

All issues

presented in this petition were adequately and correctly addressed
by the Court of Appeals.

There is nothing new or of substance

which warrants the time of this Court or that of the responding
parties.

As such, Wycalis requests the petition be denied and
14

damages be awarded pursuant to Rule 33 and Rule 40 of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court,
Dated:

November

1989.
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ORME, Judge:
Bette Wycalis, formerly the beneficiary under a trust
deed, appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment
terminating her action against Guardian Title of Utah, the
trust deed trustee, and its president, Warren Curlis. This
appeal was consolidated with another which arose from a
separate judgment entered in the same case, However, this
opinion treats only the Wycalis appeal. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.

FACTS
In July 1980, Wycalis sold Randy Krantz and Brad and
Debra Christenson a parcel of real estate located in Helper,
Utah. A promissory note dated July 1# 1980, payable to Wycalis
and her mother, Eva Robertson, was delivered to Wycalis as
partial payment for the Helper property.1 The makers of the
promissory note were R & C Associates, Krantz, and the
Christensons. The note was secured by a standard, short form
trust deed dated June 26, 1980. The trust deed, signed only by
R & C Associates, was properly executed and created a lien in
Wycalisfs favor on a parcel of Weber County property owned by
R & C Associates. Guardian Title was named as trustee under
the trust deed.
Wycalis received payments on the note from August 1980
through December 1982, at which time all payments ceased,
leaving the note substantially unpaid. Wycalis then contacted
Guardian to enforce her rights under the trust deed. Guardian
informed Wycalis that on December 26, 1980, the Weber County
property had been reconveyed to the trustor, R & C Associates,
pursuant to a request for reconveyance allegedly bearing
Wycalis9s signature. Wycalis protested this divestment of her
security interest in the property. Subsequent investigation
revealed that Wycalisfs signature had been forged on the
request for reconveyance which Guardian had received and relied
on in reconveying the trust deed property.
The forged request for reconveyance was acknowledged by a
notary who was either duped or corrupted. This document was
accompanied by a letter requesting the substitution of a trust
deed on different property as security for the promissory
note.2 Wycalis^ signature was also forged on this letter.
1. On March 31, 1983, Eva Robertson assigned her interest in
the promissory note to Wycalis.
2. Following the reconveyance of the original trust deed and
pursuant to the letter's instructions, Guardian recorded the
substituted trust deed in favor of Wycalis. This second deed
encumbered a parcel of property different from the Weber County
parcel initially encumbered. Thereafter, this second trust
deed was reconveyed by Guardian after it received yet another
forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis does not claim any
interest in the property purportedly secured by the subsequent
trust deed nor does she claim any damages arising from its
reconveyance.

Upon receiving the two forged documents, Guardian did not
contact Wycalis to verify her request, nor did it require
delivery of the original promissory note or trust deed,
although the request for reconveyance recited the note had been
paid and erroneously indicated these documents were attached.3
Wycalis filed a complaint against Guardian, Curlis,
Krantz, the Christensons, and a number of other parties not
involved in this or the related appeal. Wycalis claimed that
Guardian Title breached its duty as trustee by reconveying the
trust deed property and releasing her corresponding security
interest based on a forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis
also sought a judgment against Krantz and the Christensons for
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. The trial court
entered summary judgment against Wycalis and in favor of
Guardian. The trial court also entered summary judgment in
favor of Wycalis and against Krantz and the Christensons for
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. As indicated, both
judgments have been appealed, but we treat only the former in
this opinion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The procedural history of Wycalis9s claim against
Guardian is important to an understanding of our decision and
merits detailed review.
Prior to Guardian9s successful motion for summary
judgment, Wycalis filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on the question of Guardian's liability, wycalis claimed
Guardian was liable for the loss of her security interest
because the reconveyance was unauthorized. She cited several
cases in support of her argument. E,g,, HucKell v. Matrgpqa,
160 Cal. Rptr* 177 (Cal. App. 1979); Doyle Vt Svyetv Title &
Guar. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1968); Jeanese, Inc. v.
Surety Title & Guar. Co.. 1 Cal. Rptr. 752 (Cal. App. 1959).
Guardian's response was, primarily, to dis inguish those cases
from the instant case, claiming that they involved situations
where &£ authorization had been received by the trustee while
3 . T h e reference to the note being .paid and to these documents
being attached is curious, not only because they were not
attached, but also because a request to substitute security is
altogether inconsistent with a representation that the note has
been paid.

Guardian had received apparent, acknowledged authorization to
reconvey the property. Since "the acknowledgment of a document
gives rise to a presumption of its genuineness," Guardian
argued, a factual question existed concerning whether the
trustee's unquestioning reliance on that document was
consistent with the applicable duty of care. Guardian observed
that the only case relied on by Wycalis involving a forged
request for reconveyance was not resolved as a matber of law
but instead had been submitted to the trier of fact. Ssfi
Stephana v. Herman. 37 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Cal. App. 1964).
Guardian emphasized the need for "evidence as to the standard
of care in the local title company industry" before it could
properly be determined that Guardian breached its duty.
Wycalis9s response
litigants. She conceded
the inescapable presence
corresponding need for a
motion.

was uncharacteristic of modern
the validity of Guardian*s argument,
of material factual questions, and the
trial. Accordingly, she withdrew her

It was several months later that Guardian filed its own
motion for summary judgment, now changing its tack
considerably. Guardian argued that it owed no duty to foresee
and protect against criminal acts, such as forgery, and that,
in any event, it was entitled to rely on the acknowledged
request as a matter of law. In her response, Wycalis
unfortunately failed to remind the court of Guardian's prior
concession of unavoidable factual issues and of the need for
standard-of-care-in-the-industry evidence, which had not been
offered by Guardian in support of its motion.4 Nor did
4. The record contains two affidavits submitted by Guardian
which merit comment in this regard. The first affidavit is
that of Craig Thomsen, president of a local title company,
which was submitted by Guardian in its opposition to Wycalis*s
motion for summary judgment but not relied on in support of its
own motion. Moreover, Guardian contended that Thomsen*s
affidavit demonstrated the need for a trial and the impropriety
of Wycalis*s motion, not that Thomsen9s affidavit established
the standard of care as a matter of law. The second affidavit
is that of Warren Curlis, which is also insufficient to
establish the standard of care as a matter of law. Curlis does
not attempt to identify any industry standard in his affidavit,
but merely states his own personal experience and the fact that
he had not previously encountered a forged request for
reconveyance. Thus, these affidavits do not establish that
Guardian met the applicable standard of care as a matter of law.

Wycalis directly refute Guardian's new legal arguments.
Instead, she too changed tack. In essence, her response was
that Guardian9s new arguments were irrelevant because a forged
reconveyance, even if acknowledged, is an absolute nullity.
Thus, according to Wycalis, Guardian had, in effect, released
the security without any authority whatsoever and was therefore
liable for the loss as a matter of law.
It was in this posture of each party asserting its
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that the district
court took Guardian's motion for summary judgment under
advisement. Thereafter, the district court granted Guardian's
motion, concluding that the "great weight' afforded
acknowledged documents entitled Guardian to rely on the request
in this case since there was no showing that Guardian had any
reason to suspect a forgery. The propriety)of that disposition
is the gravamen of this appeal.
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and
necessary tool in a judicial system such as ours, which strives
for the efficient and timely resolution of legal disputes,
Granting summary judgment saves the parties and the courts the
time and expense of a full-blown trial. &££, &x£., Ainjacs
Interwesti Inc. v. Design A S S Q C S - * 635 p.2d 53, 54 (Utah
1981). However, summary judgment is approprliate only where
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to inte rrogatories/ and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as
matter of law."
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). See, e.g., Ingram v.I Salt Lake Citv.
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); terber v. Farmers
Ins, Exch.. 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Priqqs v,
Hoicomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 19 17). Appellate
courts scrutinize summary judgments under th same standard
applied by the trial courts, according no pa 'ticular deference
to the trial court's legal conclusions conce rning whether the
material facts are in dispute and, if they a :e not, what legal
result obtains. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthi &, 769 P.2d 245,
247 (Utah 1988); AtldS Corp. vt ClOVlS Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d
225, 229 (Utah 1987).
[W]e consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the losing party, and
affirm only where it appears there is no

genuine dispute as to any material iss^ues
of
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where, «"•»
• c $25inS
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authorization. As a general proposition, summary judgment is
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and
should be employed "only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram.
733 P.2d at 126. £££ &]JS£ Apache Tank Lin^s, Inc. v. Cheney,
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melbv.
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Anderson v. Toone. 671 P.2d 170,
172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436
(Utah 1982). Of particular concern is the precept that
"[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." Jackson
v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982).fififialS£ Ingram, 733
P.2d at 127; Bowen. 656 P.2d at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v.
Leatherbv Ins. Co.. 594 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 J (Utah 1979); EfiMSiUl
v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876, 877 (1964).
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the
applicable standard of care is "fixed by law," Elmer v.
Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968)i &££ jalS£ Chicago,
Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.Id 6, 10 (Okla.
1967), and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as
to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. See

Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton Y. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d
292, 431 P.2d 126, 129 (1967); English v. kienke, 774 P.2d
1154, 1156 (Ct. App. 1989). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that since summary disposition denies the losing
party -the privilege of a trial," art. I, $ 11 of the Utah
Constitution6 suggests that "doubt or uncertainty as to the
questions of negligence . • . should be resolved in favor of
granting . . . a trial." Butler v. Sports Haven Inf 1, 563
P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). Sfifi jSLlfifl Anderson, 671 P.2d at
172; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d lio, 133 (Utah 1978).
With the foregoing standards in mind, we must determine
whether Wycalis's negligence claim was properly resolved by the
district court as a matter of law, given the posture of the
case.
IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FlOR GUARDIAN
There are two fundamental problems with the summary
judgment at issue in this appeal. First, we cannot agree that
the standard of care owed by Guardian to W^calis is "fixed by
6. Art. I, § 11 is commonly known as the *open courts"
provision.

law* or even conducive to an "as a matter of law"
determination, especially in the absence of uncontroverted
standard-of-the-industry evidence.
It is true that the applicable standard of care in a
given case may be established, as a matter of law, by
legislative enactment or prior judicial decision. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 285 (1965)• £&S Alsa Elmer v. Vanderford,
445 P.2d 613, 614 (Wash. 1968). Nonetheless, Guardian has not
demonstrated that the standard of care owed by a trustee under
a trust deed when presented with a request for reconveyance has
been established in either of these ways. Thus, we are not
convinced that the applicable,, standard has yet been established
in Utah "as a matter of law.*7 Accordingly, the standard
must be established factually in the course of ultimate

7. We necessarily reject Wycalis's contention that trust deed
trustees are subject to what in essence would be a strict
liability standard. In this regard, Wycalis relies on Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1986), which provides, with our emphasis,
that Twlhen the obligation secured bv anv trust deed has been
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property.* Wycalis suggests
this language means the trustee has no authority to reconvey
property while the obligation is unpaid, and if the trust
property is reconveyed in such circumstances, the trustee is
strictly liable to the beneficiary. Such a construction is at
odds with actual commercial practice under which a beneficiary
is entitled to have the property reconveyed upon his or her
instruction, whether or not the obligation has been paid,
either because the beneficiary and the obligor agree to
substitute other security, upon receipt of additional
consideration, as part of a loan work-out, or simply because
the beneficiary feels like it. A reading of § 57-1-33 in its
entirety suggests that it is intended to operate only as a
procedural guide for trustees. We note that in drafting
S 57-1-33 the Legislature was very explicit and went to great
lengths to define the duties of the beneficiary and the
resulting liability for breach of those duties. In light of
this observation, we cannot agree that the Legislature intended
the first eleven words of § 57-1-33 to impose strict liability
on trustees. If such an onerous burden was intended, we think
the Legislature would have explicitly said so rather than leave
the matter for inference.

resolution of this case, with an emphasis 6n standard-of-carein-the-industry evidence,8
As discussed above, a trial court may not grant summary
judgment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on the
negligence issue, including resolving the applicable standard
of care, unless it correctly concludes that the jury could not
reasonably find the defendant's conduct to be negligent.9
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 comment f at 22
(1965). We hold that a jury could reasonably conclude the
standard of care owed by Guardian to Wycalis required more than
unquestioning reliance on the forged request, even though
8. Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating
the standard of care applicable here. Where the average person
has little understanding of the duties owed by particular
trades or professions, expert testimony must ordinarily be
presented to establish the standard of care. For instance,
expert testimony has been required to establish the standard of
care for medical doctors, Chadwick v. Nielsbn. 763 P.2d 817,
821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); architects. Naumab v. Harold K.
Beecher & Assocs., 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d| 610, 615 (1970);
engineers, National Housing Indust., Inc. vL E. L. Jones Dev.
£g., 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (CtL App. 1978);

insurance brokers, cf. Darner Motor Sales, Inci v, Universal
Underwriters Ins, Co,* 140 Ariz. 383, 682 p |.2d 388, 403 (1984)
(establishing standard of care "may require expert testimony*);
and professional estate executors. Estate of Beach, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en bahc). But see

Panieli form, Johnson & Menflenhell v» Hilton Hotels Corp.* 642
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1982) (expert testimony not required to
prove negligence of surveyor).
9. Our emphasis on "negligence" analysis s ould not be taken
as an implicit rejection of Wycalis's conte tion that a trust
deed trustee is a fiduciary held to a stand rd higher than one
of ordinary care. On the contrary, courts ave recognized that
a trust deed trustee is a fiduciary. See, A / Mclntvre v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co.. 658 Supp. 944, 950 (D Alaska 1986);
Hoffman v. First Bond 8» Mort. Co.. 116 Conn 320, 164 A. 656,
658 (1933). Sfifi also Spruill v. Ballard, 5 F.2d 517, 519
(D.C. App. 1932) ("trustee named in a deed f trust to secure a
loan sustains a fiduciary relation to the d btor as well as the
creditor") (cited with approval in Blodaett Vt Martsch, 590
P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978)). Nonetheless, tt^e fiduciary nature

Qftnnon_r»&

apparently acknowledged,10 as the basis for reconveying the
beneficiary1s interest. In short, Guardian was correct when it
asserted, in opposing Wycalis*s prior motion for summary
judgment, that the standard of care could not be established,
as a practical matter, without a trial.
Second, and closely related to the point above, we
believe t^hat a jury could also reasonably conclude that
Guardian breached whatever duty it owed Wycalis even though it
relied on an acknowledged document. Although the posture of
this case admittedly leaves us with some doubt as to whether
Wycalis can convince a jury that she is entitled to prevail,
consistent with precedent we resolve that doubt in favor of
permitting Wycalis an opportunity to proceed to trial. Sfifi
Butlfii, 563 P.2d at 1246-47,

(Footnote 9 continued)
of the trustee's responsibility really goes to the standard of
care to which a trustee is held, rather than to supplant
negligence analysis. Sfifl# e.o., Estate of Beach. 125 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en banc) (fiduciary held
to "more stringent standards,* consistent with rule that
"[t]hose undertaking to render expert services in the practice
of a profession or trade are required to have and apply the
skill, knowledge and competence ordinarily possessed by their
fellow practitioners under similar circumstances, and failure
to do so subjects them to liability for negligence").
10. It is of course true that acknowledged documents have a
special status in certain contexts. Properly acknowledged
documents may be admitted into evidence without other evidence
of their authenticity. SfiS Utah R. Evid. 902(8). Subject to
certain exceptions, ass Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-3 (1986), only
acknowledged documents are entitled to recordation. Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-1 (1986). It does not necessarily follow, however,
that a trust deed trustee can be said to have fully discharged
its duty of care in reconveying property in response to a
written submission which includes an acknowledged request for
reconveyance.

CONCLUSION
The summary judgment is reversed. W^ remand for trial or
such other proceedings as may be appropriate. The parties
shall bear their own costs of this appeal.

Grego,STKT Orme, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Russell W. Bencnyou
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INTRODUCTION
Respondents Guardian Title Company of Utah and
Warren H. Curlis (hereafter collectively "Guardian-)
respectfully petition this Court, pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, to grant a rehearing to
consider one issue Guardian submits the Court overlooked in its
Opinion issued August 29, 1989.

In ruling that the case must

be remanded to resolve factual issues that precluded the trial
court's entry of summary judgment, the Court did not address
Guardian's argument that it owed no duty to plaintiff to
foresee a deliberate criminal act.

Under «Utah law it is clear

that one has no duty to foresee and act upon a deliberate
criminal act perpetrated by another.

Guardians submits that

this rule of law dictates as a matter of law that it cannot be
liable to plaintiff in this action.

APCVH5NT
This Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment
on the basis that there was no evidence before the trial court
as to the standard of care that must be satisfied by a trustee
under a deed of trust when it is presented with a forged,
albeit properly acknowledged, request for reconveyance.

In so

ruling, the Court raised on plaintiff's behalf arguments that
plaintiff did not raise below, and then resolved those
arguments in plaintiff's favor.
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In this process, however, the Coiirt appears to have
overlooked one of Guardian's principal arguments to support the
trial court's summary judgment—that it had no duty to foresee
a deliberate criminal act.

In this case, plaintiff alleges

that some third party forged her name to the request for
reconveyance that was presented to Guardian, and upon which
Guardian relied to execute a deed of reconveyance of
plaintiff's deed of trust.

As Guardian a pgued in its initial

brief, it is hornbook law that one has no) duty to foresee the
criminal misconduct of third parties.
In Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (dtah 1977), the
plaintiff in a wrongful death action appealed from a jury
verdict in favor of defendant.

In Gray, the decedent had been

a guest at a New Year's Eve party at the defendant Beehive Elks
Lodge.

During the party, he got into a ffight with another

guest, Scott, at which point the lodge manager intervened and
the parties departed.

After both parties had left, the manager

was told there had been a shooting outside in the alley.
Neither the manager nor anyone else made any investigation.
Later, both the decedent and Scott returned to the party, and
Scott shot and killed the decedent.
Plaintiff brought suit against jkcott as well as the
lodge, asserting that the lodge, after ip became aware of a
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scuffle between the decedent and Scott and a shooting incident
in the alley, owed a legal duty to the decedent to take steps
to prevent the fatal shooting from occurring.
After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the
defendant lodge, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial
court had erred in giving the following instruction:
You are instructed that a private lodge or
association, as well as its officers, has no
duty to anyone to anticipate that a jjjmD
will be committed bv another person, and to
act upon that belief.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs argument.

Even

though the lodge manager was aware of a shooting incident in
the alley, and thus the imminent risk of serious injury to
those at the party, the Court held that the foregoing
instruction properly stated Utah law:

*[I]t was not error to

instruct that defendants had no duty to antic^p^^ frho
commission of the subject crime."

Ifl. at 78 (emphasis added).

The rule declared in Qx$Y vf Scott disposes of the
issue before this Court as a matter of law.

in Gray, the

defendant lodge manager was on notice of a specific and grave
risk of harm to plaintiff and other guests.
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There had been a

shooting right outside his party.

One jnight, in such a

situation, reasonably foresee a shooting inside the party.
Yet, the Court there held that defendant owed no duty to
anticipate and protect plaintiff from tpe defendant's criminal
act.
The record in this case, quite to the contrary,
indicates that Guardian had no notice whatsoever of any risk
that plaintiff might be victimized by a criminal act.

Instead,

in reliance on a properly acknowledged request for
reconveyance, Guardian performed the duties imposed on it by
the Utah Code and reconveyed the trust property.

It never had

any reason to believe or suspect that tjhe request was not
authentic.
The forgery was unforeseeable ^s a matter of law.

As

the record shows, Guardian has executed literally hundreds of
deeds of reconveyance based on written (requests for
reconveyance.

On no other occasion has there ever been a

forged request.

R. at 399-400.

This c biminal forgery was

completely unforeseeable to Guardian; uhder Gray v. Scott.
Guardian owed no legal duty to protect blaintiff against it.
See also Respondents' Brief on Appeal, pp. 28-37.
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CONCLUSION
The case at bar cannot be distinguished from Gray v.
Scott.

Respondents submit this Court should reconsider its

prior Opinion, and affirm the trial court's summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of September,
1989.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK .STHCQpNOUGH

David R. M0iney
' George W</pratt
Attorneys for Guardian Title
Company of Utah and Warren H,
Curlis
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Eric P. Hartman
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